Abstract
Introduction
With the prosperity of online gaming, anti-social behaviors and criminal activities have developed concomitantly. In Taiwan, since 2001, many cybercriminal cases related to online games have occurred, e.g. theft, fraud, robbery, threat, sabotage and others. According to the statistics of the National Police Administration of Taiwan [5] , there were 3553 cyber crime cases within which 3983 criminals were prosecuted during 2002. Astonishingly, more than 1300 of these cases were related to online gaming, with online cheating being the most serious criminal behavior.
The design of secure software from the start has been advocated by Viega & McGraw [2] and McGraw [3] . Other researchers have looked at other ways for designing secure software for a particular stage of the software lifecycle or for a particular type of software, or using a particular methodology [4] . Designing secure online games calls for the following steps [2] :
1. Identify potential threats to the online game and how these threats may be carried out.
2. Identify countermeasures to avoid the threats identified in step 1. 3. Use the countermeasures identified in step 2 as security requirements for development. 4 . Design and implement the online game, accounting for the security requirements as well as the functional requirements, using secure coding practices. 5. Test the implemented code to make sure security requirements as well as functional requirements are satisfied. These steps only capture the essence of the design for security approach; however, they serve our purpose, which is not to present design for security in detail but to use it to show that securely designed online games would avoid most of the online gaming crimes experienced. To achieve this purpose, we only need to carry out steps 1 and 2 (also known as threat modeling). We assume that steps 3, 4 and 5 are also done, resulting in an online game that satisfies all the identified security requirements.
We focus on the massively multiplayer online roleplaying game or MMORPG (Table 1) since it is the most popular online game in Asia. Section 2 describes threat modeling and builds a threat model for MMORPGs. Section 3 presents a security analysis to identify which online gaming crimes could have been avoided using our approach. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Threat modeling for MMORPG
Threat modeling or threat analysis is a method for systematically assessing and documenting the security risks associated with a system [6] . The results can help development teams identify the strengths and weaknesses of the system and serve as a basis for investigations into vulnerabilities and required mitigation. Threat modeling involves understanding the adversary's goals in attacking the system based on the system's assets of interest.
Method
The method used here for threat modeling is based on [6] , consisting of the following steps: 1) identify threats, 2) create attack trees for the system, 3) apply weights to the leaves, 4) prune the tree so that only exploitable leaves remain, and 5) generate corresponding countermeasures.
Step 1: Identify threats
By considering the characteristics of a MMORPG system (Table 1) , we arrive at the following list of potential threats from an adversary:
• Gain illegal access to play the game • Cheat at game play • Disrupt game play • Cheat at paying for game play • Steal proprietary parts of the software Steps 2, 3, and 4: Create attack trees, apply weights, and prune The 5 attack trees corresponding to the threats of step 1 together with their weighting, and pruning follow. The weighting of each leaf is denoted by a triple (risk, access, cost) where each member of the triple has values H (high), M (medium), and L (low). Pruned nodes are indicated using grey highlighting. Deciding which nodes may be pruned depends in part on the level of fanaticism to which game players can be pushed in the "heat of the moment". The higher this level, the more risk and cost the adversary is willing to bear. Since experience shows that this level can be very high for Asians playing MMORPGs, we chose to prune nodes with combinations of M's and at least one H to reflect a high tolerance for risk and cost. 
Gain illegal access to play the game

.2. Hack into server and copy code (L, M, L) 5.3. Use Trojans to transmit desired code or design documents (L, L, L) 5.4. Use social engineering to acquire proprietary information (M, M, L) 5.5. Kidnap members of design team (H, M, M)
Step 5: Generate corresponding countermeasures Table 2 lists our proposed countermeasures for each attack path in the pruned attack trees. Same as for 1, 1.1, 1.1.5
As can be seen, the above countermeasures include physical security remedies as well as information security solutions. They are not the only countermeasures that may be applied. In addition, some of the attacks should perhaps not be considered as attacks (e.g. 2, 2.1, 2.1.1), depending on the rules of game play and what people may be naturally inclined to do (as long as no laws are broken).
Security analysis of secure MMORPG vs. observed crimes
We now examine the observed crimes given by Yan & Choi [7] (first 11 below) and Chen et al [8] (last 6 below) to see which of these crimes our countermeasures cover (indicated in italics). 
Conclusions
The above analysis shows that by developing a secure MMORPG system, 12 out of 17 (70.6 %) threat risks to the system have been significantly reduced through the use of countermeasures. Of the 5 threats that were not covered by the countermeasures, threat number 12 is due to human behavior that was difficult to foresee, threat number 8 was an oversight of threat modeling, threat number 3 almost doesn't count because it was a design give-away, and threat numbers 1 and 2 were not modeled due to lack of clarity concerning the rules of game play.
In addition, the design for security approach has put in place countermeasures for new threats that are not part of the 17 crimes or threats from [7, 8] . Some of these new threats are a) insider attacks to get revenge on the company, b) disrupting game play by intercepting traffic and injecting bad traffic, c) attacks to get legitimate time card serial numbers, d) attacks on connection time tracker software, and e) attacks to steal proprietary parts of the software. This shows that the design for security approach can prepare for threats that adversaries have not yet considered (but will consider eventually).
